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Abstract 
This paper discusses how network theory and social capital can help explain different patterns of inclusion 
of small-scale and medium sized producers in agri-food clusters. We make the argument that despite the 
centralized nature of practices, the manner in which inclusion takes place can vary significantly depending 
on structural features of local networks and governance factors, especially social capital and the role of 
lead organisations. Social network analysis allows us to investigate how different patterns of bonding, 
bridging and centrality of key actors in agricultural clusters can influence diffusion of knowledge. We 
frame this discussion through a typology that allows us to identify diverse scenarios of inclusion of small-
scale producers. This is then used to guide an empirical analysis of two agri-food clusters of small-scale 
producers in Peru (mango) and Colombia (palm oil). Judicious use of mixed methods and the typology can 
prove useful to explain diverse patterns of inclusion which have important implications for small-scale 
agricultural producers. 
1 Introduction 
A significant body of policy thinking views the growth and spread of agribusiness and specifically 
agri-food activity in economically developing countries as a positive step for small-scale agricultural 
producers (Kumar et al., 2010; UNDP, 2010; Vorley et al., 20081). The opportunities to open new markets 
can act as a spur for investment in infrastructure in rural areas and the provision of agricultural extension 
services can enhance productivity and knowledge transfer capabilities for small-scale farmers. However, 
other voices raise concerns and associate incorporation of small-scale producers in commodity export 
activity with over-dependence of vulnerable farmers on unstable markets and over-reliance on large buyer 
firms (Cáceres, 2015; Markelova et al., 20092). Hence, although growth of agri-food activities is 
considered an important policy tool to allow hitherto marginalised farming communities to gain a foothold 
in expanding markets (Gomes, 2007; McCormick, 1999), the dynamics of inclusion may be quite different 
for small-scale producers. The question that we address in this paper is how different local arrangements 
around construction of local networks and network governance can lead to diverse forms of inclusion that 
have contrasting outcomes for small-scale producers in terms of access to knowledge and new practices. 
By the term inclusion we refer to the insertion of small-scale producers in local networks of 
knowledge transfer that exist to supply agribusiness markets. We are therefore particularly interested in the 
structure and governance of these networks at the cluster level where small-scale producers are 
agglomerated. Structures of social networks provide insights into the connectedness of actors and their 
social capital and they can also show the diversity of knowledge available to actors and the resources 
actors have at their disposal (Cagnin et al., 2012; Carpenter et al., 2012). Governance of networks on the 
other hand can explain how new technologies and practices are introduced and the agency of specific 
actors (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). Our approach therefore addresses a concern that existing studies of 
diffusion of technology in agri-food contexts, that often focus on relationships within chains of production, 
can often leave out local dynamics. 
We frame the analysis within a typology3 of inclusion that lays out four scenarios in a two-by-two 
matrix, the axes of which are labelled as network bridging (a proxy for openness of the cluster), network 
bonding (the degree of internal connectedness of local actors) and a parallel measure of small producer 
participation (or network governance). The discussion and typology act as a guide to an empirical analysis 
of two agricultural clusters with contrasting experiences of inclusion. These are a palm oil cluster in the 
municipality of Puerto Wilches in central - north east Colombia and the mango cluster in the Piura area of 
northern Peru. These geographical clusters share a number of features including similar number of 
producers, dominant agri-food export industry and the predominance of small-scale producers. Social 
network analysis is used initially to identify and compare the structure of networks. Because network 
structure has little to say about governance and the source of new ideas/programs we subsequently use 
qualitative material to assess differences in governance. We end with illustrative cases of two possible 
permutations that indicate how different combinations of network structures combine with network 
governance to affect the development of inclusive agriculture. These suggest that a highly hierarchical and 
centralized network cluster will be strongly influenced by actor(s) at the centre of the network, and 
therefore that inclusion dynamics can vary considerably according to behaviour of these anchor actors. By 
contrast, greater decentralisation of links and small producer self-organisation is associated to sub-
networks that, within the confines of narrow protocols and certifications imposed by buyer chains, are still 
able to follow different strategies of inclusion for adoption and use of technology. 
2 Inclusion of small-scale producers in agri-food: a social 
network approach lens 
There exists a dominant view amongst agricultural extension practitioners that small producer 
inclusion in agri-food markets primarily comes down to diffusion of information of practices. The focus 
lies on codification of top-down systems of knowledge transfer and the propagation of “packages” of new 
practices and protocols by agricultural extension services to farmers (Morris, 1991). A significant body of 
academic literature addressing questions of small-scale producer farming in agribusiness reinforces this 
view, especially in regard to less developed economies. For example, from the natural resource 
management perspective it is recognized that state-funded extension services will organise technology 
transfer in a top-down manner (Darr and Pretzsch, 2008; Lahai et al., 1999). Driving these practices is a set 
of regulations handed down by large buyer firms or national scientific consortiums designed to meet 
standards of quality that reflect narrow codified protocols. The global value chain literature similarly 
focusses on the quality of predominantly top-down diffusion of knowledge. For example Dolan and 
Humphrey (2000, 2004), whilst recognising the efforts of UK supermarkets to achieve a more hands-on 
relationship with different actors in value chains, suggest greater use of detailed written protocols and 
procedures for growing, harvesting, processing and transport. Humphrey (2006) and Jan van Roekel et al. 
(2002) also argue that the initial simple distinctions between buyer-driven and production-driven 
agribusiness supply chains described in Dolan and Humphrey (2000) has given way to more nuanced 
relationships between actors in the chain. Nevertheless, within the above accounts local institutions and 
small-scale producers appear to be fairly passive observers as new practices are introduced by large buyers 
further up the value chain or by national scientific consortiums. 
There is of course an extensive body of literature which has criticized narrow top-down 
approaches to diffusion and technical change (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) in agricultural developmental 
contexts (Clarke and Ramirez, 2014). The critique is that in centralized systems, new practices are 
introduced and justified on the basis of reductionist discourses of “sound science” (Essex, 2008) that 
privilege one way linear flows of information from “technical experts” to individual farmers (Rogers, 
2010). However, little is said in this account regarding the difficulties of incorporating small-scale 
producers where the dominant norms for introducing new practices are centralized and top-down. 
A difficulty of the debates concerning inclusive approaches in agri-food and agribusiness more 
generally is that much work is either framed around assumptions that prioritize top-down diffusion of 
technology that leaves little room for agency of small-scale producers or on micro studies that promote 
bottom-up participation and democratization processes that can be difficult to achieve in agri-food 
environments where protocols for production, certifications and food safety standards are inflexible. We 
are therefore left somewhat unclear about how local contingencies can influence inclusion outcomes. 
Yet, some studies show that inclusive paths to incorporation of small-scale producers in Andean 
agri-business contexts can occur by building local social capital. In particular, detailed case study work by 
Bebbington (1997) and Bebbington (1998) show how local organisations have, in some circumstances, 
been able to regenerate rural small farm production by managing, accessing and generating technologies 
and providing technical assistance to local producers, as well as establishing strong external 
linkages including negotiating with the state, accessing markets and linking with financial services. These 
studies are to some extent antecedents to this paper for they set out the importance of social capital and 
brokers for local development. This paper takes these studies further by developing qualitative and 
quantitative methodology that allow a more in-depth understanding of the organisational and cluster 
dynamics.  
Reflecting on the above critique, we adopt an approach that relies on a relational approach that 
allows us to incorporate both structural and contingent features of local clusters. The basis of our argument 
is that important inter-cluster differences in inclusion can be analysed from how local patterns of network 
structure and network governance emerge. Network structure refers to the connections actors establish to 
receive information and know-how and their position (central, connected or marginal) within this network. 
The structure of a local buyer-driven agribusiness network is likely to be dominated by large buyers with 
separate links to suppliers of commodities. Small producers that sell these commodities to local buyers 
may be scattered or may establish their own social ties and collaborations within a geographical cluster. 
Therefore we take a broad view of network formation that reminds us that there can be a range of network 
structures within which patterns of inclusion, social fragmentation and exclusion can exist (Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Network governance on the other hand refers to the nature of the 
relationships between actors including the degree of participation small producers have in how practices 
are introduced. Below we lay out the main arguments. 
3 Debating network structure: bonding and bridging 
Social networks (and its associated theory of social capital) has been a recurrent topic of debate 
and discussion on collective action and development. It became particularly fashionable after the World 
Bank adopted social capital as a key policy tool in the 1990s to encourage a social agenda to reduce social 
exclusion and build community capacity (Bebbington et al., 2008). The fact that the delivery of everyday 
goods and services by the state is non-existent or highly deficient in less economically developed countries 
means that network type structures such as community groups often play an essential role in public 
provision (Fafchamps, 2006) which heightens the importance of connectedness. At the centre of our 
discussion will be different network structures and the relationships (and potential tensions) between 
bonding represented by highly connected actors and bridging that represents open networks that encourage 
the search for new knowledge and innovation. As discussed below, these two features of networks and the 
relationships between them appear repeatedly in studies of development. 
Network structures can be analysed around two commonly used lenses. At one end is a spectrum 
composed of dense networks, referred to as “bonding”, where social practices are directed to increasing 
cohesion in communities and practices tend to be more homogenous (Coleman, 2000). Hence participation 
in the production of common products ostensibly facilitates complementary linkages (Visser, 1999). 
Collective action that emerges from bonding activity has traditionally played an important role in family 
agriculture, with authors such as (Schmitz, 1995) arguing that “active collective efficiency'” can overcome 
the drawbacks of small size and the problems facing small producers emerge more from isolation than 
size. Coleman (2000) argues that the advantage of bonding lies primarily in the ability to establish and 
impose common rules and norms because network members have the power to decide who joins and who 
is excluded and can sanction opportunistic members. This creates a degree of predictability in the 
behaviour of others and allows greater investment in partners. It is also facilitated through a common bond, 
such as homogeneity of socio-economic status. 
An alternative view of social networks eschews the advantages of bonding and by contrast extolls 
the virtues of bridging, which is where information flows between rather than within dense networks. Burt 
(1992) refers to these as bridging networks that can be exploited by organisations that act as brokers of 
information flows amongst individual actors. In contrast to the bonding approach, bridging emphasizes to a 
greater extent the benefits that actors have when freed from tight relationships. This approach therefore 
emphasizes to a far greater degree the importance of linking to knowledge networks that come from 
outside the cluster. The key notion here is that highly dense networks can suffer from redundant 
information and in this scenario, the coordination costs of maintaining a network can outweigh the 
advantages that might emerge from it. The focus therefore lies in individual actors acting as brokers with 
access to less redundant information through strategic position in a network. Bridging as a specific division 
of labour addresses a critical feature of this discussion which is how open, diverse and innovative 
agribusiness clusters can be and how this diversity can benefit the different parts of the network. Research 
highlighting the importance of brokering in smallholder agriculture includes Goldberger's (2008) study of 
scientization of organic agriculture, where brokers were crucial in the legitimization of alternative value 
chains. A boundary framework is used to understand how negotiation among socially and geographically 
disparate social worlds has resulted in diffusion of non-certified organic agriculture in Kenya. Giuliani and 
Bell (2005) also emphasize the importance of brokers to link with global buyers in Chilean the wine sector. 
Debates and evidence on bonding and bridging reflect important discussions on the 
complementarities and possible trade-offs and tensions between building collective action and 
strengthening social capital for small-scale producers to exercise agency power on the one hand and the 
potential drawbacks of tight membership rules that can lead to exclusion and inwardness that resists new 
innovations on the other (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Bebbington et al., 2008; Carter, 1996; Thorp et al., 
2005). For example, the argument is made that for openness to occur internal differentiation between 
producers is required to allow the necessary leadership to evolve and encourage greater openness. Devaux 
et al. (2009) also makes the point that heterogeneity and the involvement of diverse actors, including not 
only farmers but also other actors in the value chain (including chefs) played a critical role in collective 
action for innovation in a case study of the Papa Andina. A balance between bonding and bridging of 
activities could in theory encourage connectivity and heterogeneity of actors necessary to combine 
inclusion and innovation (Narayan, 1999; Pelling and High, 2005). Indeed, Burt (1992) has argued that 
bridging is interdependent to bonding because communities can have a division of labour that moves 
between the two. Clearly this is an area that needs empirical analysis to understand more clearly how 
bonding and bridging are formed. 
4 Network governance: hierarchies, central actors and 
bottom-up action 
In addition to bonding and bridging, we introduce a third lens to consider how new innovation 
practices are introduced through the governance of social networks. Isolated from the influence of other 
contextual factors, information on network structures say little about how inclusive practices are 
introduced or distinguishes between different modes of introducing new knowledge that can have 
fundamentally different implications for small-scale producers. The discussion of social networks therefore 
requires another dimension that picks up on the hierarchy or level of centralization of small-scale producer 
networks in terms of the roll out, adoption and adaptation of new technologies and practices. This question 
overlaps with a long and intense debate in the agricultural development literature on preferences for top-
down and bottom-up governance for the introduction of new practices. Preferences for top-down practices 
are inherent in Hardin's (1968) “tragedy of commons” argument that pointed to the tendency towards over-
consumption of common resources and Olson's (1965) concerns over free-riding of public goods. Top-
down and more centralized implementation of new practices is argued to work best if there are benefits 
from economies of scale, require high levels of central coordination and where preferences and needs are 
likely to be more homogenous (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). 
Bottom-up initiatives by contrast provide for greater participation of local actors. Highly 
influential contributions by Hirschman (1970) on collective agency, Ostrom (2015) on common pool 
resources and Sugden and Sen (1986) on broad-based capabilities emphasize the importance of the poor 
and marginalised as informed participants to justify decentralized bottom-up initiatives. Bottom-up 
inspired practices emphasize knowledge that draws from the practical experience of producers and takes 
into account their interests, hence is more likely to reflect on issues such as costs of purchase and 
maintenance of technology. 
As argued above, agri-food is likely to be dominated by more centralized practices although there 
can be important local factors that can influence how practices are introduced. Based on the above 
discussion of bridging, bonding and network governance, in the following section we present a typology 
that provides hypothetical scenarios of inclusion (and exclusion) of small-scale producers in agri-food 
clusters. The advantage of different scenarios is that they can help guide the design of future empirical 
studies. 
5 Building a typology of inclusion of small-scale producers 
in agri-food 
Our approach is built on the understanding that social networks reflect the cohesive social 
relationships upon which collective actions are built (Hoff, 2001). Social networks have the advantage of 
providing a rigorous language for describing the properties of relations and measurable indicators for 
certain properties that underlie social capital (for example membership of social groups, connectivity, 
hierarchical relations) (Moody and Paxton, 2009). On the other hand, social capital concepts explain how 
social networks come to exist and highlight how context shapes relations. The value of this typology 
therefore is that it moves the narrative on from a discussion of the influence of separate discrete variables 
(bonding, bridging and participation) to a discussion of the interplay of three variables and its impact in a 
common space. This allows us to operationalise and contextualise the framework to the cluster level and 
lays the ground for the subsequent empirical analysis. We also underline the point that this is a typology of 
inclusion and is therefore built from the standpoint of all producers and service organisations and their 
links within the cluster. This is described visually in a two-by-two matrix in Fig. 1 with three labelled axes 
that we call bridging, bonding and participation, with values rising as one moves along the axis. Low 
levels of bridging means the cluster will be relatively closed to diverse sources of new knowledge because 
there are few knowledge links outside the cluster. This means high levels of redundancy of information 
within the cluster that could translate into mono production and limited attempts to introduce new 
practices. Low bridging could also leave the cluster prone to natural-resource crisis such as pests and 
blights that affect producers because little research is undertaken to combat and keep up-to-date with 
changing phytosanitary trends. By contrast, high bridging is associated with a range of links from different 
organisations from outside the cluster and therefore provides greater diversity of knowledge. This may lead 
to more innovation and experimentation with new seeds, crops and adjustment to local conditions, as well 
as strategies to reach new markets that require different protocols for production and logistics. 
 
Fig. 1 Typology of social capital and inclusion of farmers. 
•  
•  
On the bottom axis we place bonding that, as discussed, refers to the degree of connectedness 
between small producers. High bonding implies that knowledge transfer will be efficient as networks are 
highly cohesive. Burt (1992) also refers to these highly dense networks as “closure” and suggests that in 
highly cohesive groups, strong culture and teams can enhance trust and allow reputation to be controlled so 
that individuals can be trusted to collaborate. 
To these two axes we superimpose a governance axis labelled participation, which refers to the 
degree of collective activity in decisions concerning introduction of new practices. Low levels of 
participation imply weak small-scale producer representation or independent levels of coordination and a 
high degree of power and influence in a central administrative body to establish protocols for everything 
from combatting agricultural diseases or reform of energy distribution systems (Soumonni, 2010). In these 
cases new technologies or organisational innovations are introduced in a more centralized fashion and 
power, in the sense of the ability to frame how new practices are designed and used, is more concentrated 
within certain organisations with high agency power. Top-down practices may also reflect strategies by a 
large company to oblige smaller producers to adopt specific practices for its benefit in the market, or 
indeed favour some groups over others. By contrast, with high participation, extensive local discussions 
will tend to take place regarding new technologies and practices and questions of democracy, sustainability 
and frugal innovation tend to be prioritised. 
Bonding and participation are not identical concepts. The latter is explicitly defined in terms of 
collective agency power, the former is a feature of a physical network that can emerge for a variety of 
reasons including a desire to establish solidaristic values that underpin community actions (Thompson, 
2003) to enhance capability (Moser, 1998), or as an antidote to vulnerability (Isham, 2002). Nevertheless, 
it is reasonable to assume that some sort of coherence amongst networks will underpin community action 
and as (Burt, 1992) suggests, in highly dense networks (or high bonding) a strong collective culture 
emerges that enhances trust and there is liable to be a closer relationship between actors. Therefore we 
associated high levels of bonding with higher levels of small–producer participation in the typology. 
Where bonding is low actors will not be able to act collectively. Formal connections with a lead 
organisation may exist but is likely to be one-way with high dependence upon one dominant organisation. 
Different degrees of bonding, bridging and participation can be thought of as generating distinct 
scenarios as shown in Fig. 1. We label a cluster that is open with high levels of bridging but low cohesion 
and weak participation as fragmented. This will occur when some dominant actors have important external 
and non-redundant ties that bring new knowledge, but large numbers of small-scale producers have few 
links and limited access to diverse sources of knowledge and there is a low tradition of community 
engagement. This may give way to new practices being introduced with little discussion and can create a 
polarisation between the larger producers that are well-connected to agribusiness networks on the one hand 
and smaller producers reliant on single connections with narrow bandwidth on the other. The network 
architecture may be visualised in terms of a “hub and spoke” structure with a central organisation linking 
small-scale producers in one-to-one type links. Diffusion can therefore be rapid but learning may be 
through imitation and with limited scope for local discussion. This is typically the case when implementing 
norms set by outside bodies to open export markets, such as detailed by Carbajal and Hernandez (2008) in 
the Mexican avocado sector where discussions tended to be limited to implementation of fixed protocols 
and technologies defined by outside actors. In this segment there may also be clusters that are in the early 
stages opening up to markets. For example Heller and Isaac’s (2003) account of a participatory programme 
in Kerala stressed the efforts to bring the community together by encouraging certain more democratically 
aware citizens to engage in civic activities that resulted in better local government. This was a precursor to 
the establishment of working committees and village meetings that increased participation. 
A network showing high bonding, low levels of bridging and high participation we label as 
a cohesive network. High network cohesion knits actors together and practices can diffuse widely. Key 
service organisations will focus on bringing together fragmented actors and creating infrastructures that 
can serve as a basis for common action. However there are limited opportunities for exploration because of 
a lack of bridgers and introduction of new ideas from outside is given a lower priority. Thus it is likely that 
most of the efforts of the lead organisations involve protecting connected producers from information 
inconsistent with what they already know. Links tend to be established between actors with similar 
backgrounds, which lowers risk, reduces exposure and therefore assumes knowledge transfer within a set 
boundary that could be a geographical area. In this scenario, lead organisations (whether large single 
producers or representatives of collectives), will tend to use their authority to strengthen collective actions. 
High bonding therefore suggests (but doesn’t necessarily represent proof of) a community where activities 
and learning are based on strong common norms. But without brokers, practices may well be inward 
looking and focus on existing experience. McDermott et al. (2009) description of the San Juan wine cluster 
in Argentina showed that despite the existence of high social capital, the lack of cross cutting ties between 
different social and producer communities limited broad-based learning. Hence redundancy and lock-in is 
possible. Where both brokerage is low and communities are largely fragmented there is a dearth of 
opportunities and/or capabilities amongst local actors to attain these. 
We characterise a scenario of high openness to external ideas and broad based inclusion as 
an open and inclusive cluster. This scenario is where high bonding connects actors and bridging creates 
links to new sources of knowledge. High rates of social participation means some adaptation of new 
practices and technologies in response to small-scale producer requirements takes place. An example could 
be McDermott et al's (2009) study of the Mendoza wine cluster, where bridging roles are played by 
government support institutes such as public research labs and training centres that are also committed to 
deliver collective resources. Devaux et al's (2009) study of participatory market chain model and 
stakeholder platforms in the Andean potato similarly showed how small-scale farmers were able to achieve 
high levels of organisation with the benefit of researchers and other service providers to experiment in 
finding new markets from existing varieties. New relationships are encouraged and built within the context 
of stability of existing ties, but high levels of social participation ensures there is extensive local discussion 
and efforts are made to ensure the involvement of small-scale producers and their organisations. Social 
capital exists alongside opportunities for learning and innovation. Because there is high levels of 
participation, shared use of technology is often favoured by small-scale producers as a means of lowering 
costs. 
Finally, we label a cluster where networks are typically fragmented and there is little scope for 
brokerage opportunities as redundancy. This could describe a mature agribusiness sector or isolated area 
where there exist few opportunities for new markets and few lead organisations able to support isolated 
communities in the development of capabilities. Participation will be limited and practices often not suited 
to the needs of smaller producers. The absence of collective initiatives means some actors will typically 
remain marginalised and large inequalities can be locked in. 
 
6 Methodology 
Fig. 1 poses a series of ideal-type scenarios of small-scale producer involvement in agri-food 
knowledge networks. We proceed to present and discuss two empirical studies cases of clusters in 
developing economy contexts guided by the above typology. The case studies are based on the palm oil 
cluster in the municipality of Puerto Wilches in north east Colombia and the mango cluster in the Piura 
area of Northern Peru. These geographical clusters share a number of features, but also show some 
important structural differences. 
Table 1 provides details of some of the main characteristics of each. Small and medium-sized 
(rather than micro) producers represent the majority of growers in terms of numbers of producers and as a 
proportion of total production in the cluster. Definitions of what is small, medium and large are important. 
However, we draw on Fernandez-stark et al. (2012) who view that size is a heterogeneous concept because 
beyond the physical size of land, producers have different levels of access to services and water. In our 
case we also distinguish producers through their reliance on larger producers for access to markets. Both 
clusters are highly labour intensive with limited possibilities for mechanisation but there is buoyant 
demand for these products in national (palm oil) and international (mango) markets. However the clusters 
also resemble aspects of what Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) have called survival clusters that suffer 

















Mango Palm Oil 
Size 
Omitting one large outlier producer, the 
average size of PROMANGO producers is 
51 ha and 124 for APEM members 
Ranges from 7 to 26 ha with an average of 9 ha 
Employees Just 5 out of 26 producers employs less than 10 people, although work is seasonal Mostly family. Some employees hired that live locally 
Market 16 out of 26 producers sell product in international markets 
Oil palm bunches are sold in local market to processing mill. E1 is the 
only processing mill represent in this sample 
 
Certification 18 producers are certificated by GlobalGap, 4 have Tesco TNC 
The most recognized certification is given by the RSPO (Round on 
Sustainable Palm Oil). Few oil palm growers certified 
Other 
livelihood Some attempt to diversify to grape production 
Most small-scale farmers combine a small amount (2 ha) of traditional 




The palm oil cluster began production through the creation of a palm oil refinery firm in 1961, 
whilst export production for the mango began in the 1990s with the establishment of key service 
organisations and producer associations. As Table 1 shows, the mango producers have two main 
associations, APEM and PROMANGO. The latter represents the smaller producers with an average size of 
51 ha. By contrast, in the palm oil all but one of the producers has a smaller scale of production with an 
average size of 9 ha. 
The unit of analysis is the geographical cluster since physical proximity plays an important role in 
knowledge networks. Two sets of identical surveys were used, one for producers (17 in the palm oil, 26 in 
the mango cluster), and one for service organisations (9 in the mango cluster, 5 in the palm oil). Analysis 
of survey data was undertaken through social network analysis (SNA) techniques that permit visualization 
and measurement of the structures of relationships and the strategic of positioning of actors in these 
relationships. The survey data was gathered in both clusters through identical face-to-face surveys. The 
question asked to firms was: “from whom did your organisation (or business) receive technical assistance 
for the introduction of new practices and/or technologies and how important was this to your 
organisation”?4 Respondents were provided a list of organisations (producers, services, universities, 
consultancies) and an open section to name other organisations from whom assistance had been received 
and to then identify and rank organisations from whom assistance was received from 1 to 5 in ascending 
order of importance. From this information it was possible to produce a network map using open source 
software, Pajek for social network analysis. 
The subsequent analysis of network governance was investigated through in-depth semi-
structured interviews of actors in both clusters. Qualitative data in the palm oil cluster involved two 
interviews with small-scale farmer representatives, two interviews with executives of large palm oil 
companies, and shadowing of CENIPALMA R&D and field staff. Group discussions also took place with 
high level officials of CENIPALMA and FEDEPALMA (Colombian palm oil’s two linked 
representatives). 
In the case of the mango cluster, twenty semi-structured interviews took place with owners of 
small and medium-sized mango firms and directors of the main intermediaries including APEM, 
PROMANGO, and several government agencies with offices located in Piura. The producer association 
congresses of APEM and PROMANGO were attended and detailed notes made as observers. 
7 Agri-food and social capital 
Existing literature on social capital and small holder participation in agri-food in developmental 
contexts, including Andean contexts suggests that common practices and community action are driven by 
two factors, access markets and addressing exclusion. The former camp includes the work of Hellin et al. 
(2009), Hartwich et al. (2008) and Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson (2012) who all emphasize that 
greater product differentiation and complexity of products as well as high transaction costs to enter 
markets increases the likelihood of collective participation and networks (and social learning) amongst 
small holders. Other studies find that even where the product has low transaction costs, small-scale 
producers can still gain advantages from collective organisation in terms of for example bulk-buy and 
securing access (Devaux et al., 2009; Hartwich et al., 2008; Kherallah et al., 2002; Thorp et al., 2005). 
A rather different explanation for the existence of social capital is presented in other studies where 
the focus is on the properties that bond together communities facing asymmetries of knowledge from 
powerful actors. Bernard and Spielman's (2009) work on poor farmers in Ethiopia showed that low 
participation rates of the poorest farmers had little to do with lack of material interests, but that they were 
often excluded from decision making. This finding is in line with Thompson and Scoones (1994) who 
argue that agribusiness involves encounters between organisations with varied interests, supported by 
different resources and relations of power. Therefore a critical reflection of farmer-researcher-extensionist 
relations should be in terms of equity of relationships and biases of actors. 
The significant feature of the above discussion is that quite contrasting narratives of social capital 
seem to co-exist. The literature tends to favour one or other approach in its methodology although in 
practice they influence one another, such as in the emergence of alternative organic or fair trade value 
chains. The two cases discussed in this paper represent undifferentiated products at the point in which 
small-scale producers work with them. Capacity is important but occurs higher up the value chain in 
preventative measures to reduce blights, certification and ensuring delivery of good quality produce. 
The Colombian palm oil is dominated by three specific features. The first is the growing 
importance of small-scale producers as a proportion of cultivated land in the industry.5. This has come 
about following a government and United Nations sponsored programme of land distribution 
titled “Productive Alliances” to provide small-scale farmers with alternatives to growing illicit drugs. Ten 
years ago large firms purchased (from small holders) just 30% of the fruit for refining, in 2010 this jumped 
to 70% (Cordoba, 2011), therefore their relationship with small-scale producers is critical for accessing 
regular supply. 
Secondly, the sector experiences excess demand, firstly as a consequence of the rise in domestic 
demand of palm oil for use as a bio-fuel and secondly as consequence of the spread of the Pudricion del 
Cogollo (PC), (translated but root disease) an airborne disease affecting tropical areas that has wiped out 
large numbers of palm trees. Large resources have been devoted to prevention measures against the PC and 
its treatment by CENIPALMA. Two prominent approaches include the replacement of the indigenous 
Colombia palm tree by the “African palm”, a hybrid, that is hoped will be more resistant. The second 
approach involves agricultural practices (maintenance of hydration infrastructure and weed control) and 
plant disease treatment (combination of fertilizer, pesticides and insecticides). 
The third feature is the industry organisation in the rural areas. Small farms tend to geographically 
cluster around large refinery palm oil plants in so-called UATTAS. The land surrounding the refinery is 
owned partly by the refinery firm and partly by small producers called “allies” who sell the basic produce 
to the larger refinery. Physical proximity between the producer of palm oil and refinery firm is crucial to 
maintain freshness. There are therefore two key organisations at the centre of each cluster, a refinery firm 
and in some cases a small-scale producer association. 
Studies of palm oil in Colombia however also need to take into account what can be quite 
contrasting local histories and patterns of social capital can vary significantly at regional and local level. In 
a number of areas such as Cano Seco, Tamboral and Arenales in the south west, and Bajo Ataro in the 
northwest of the country, so-called “new entrepreneurs” took up palm oil production in the 1980s and 
1990s in zones affected by the conflict with armed guerrilla forces. Lands were “cleared” for palm oil 
production through the displacement of farmers with the help of paramilitary forces (Vidal, 2011). In other 
regions, including the central parts of Colombia, that is the focus of this study, small holders have a longer 
history of involvement combining contract farming, spot price sales and as agricultural labour. The take up 
of national initiatives such as the Productive Alliances has been generally well received, particularly since 
many farmers do not have access to land and are therefore likely to be framed through opportunities for 
productive activity. 
The structure of the mango cluster in Piura resembles the palm oil in terms of the numeric 
dominance of smaller and medium sized producers (see Table 1) and the production of a single agricultural 
commodity. Piura is one of the Peru’s country’s most important agricultural regions. Post-war investments 
from the World Bank in water storage and management helped overcome the challenges of an arid climate, 
although export of mangos only began to increase significantly in the 1990s when the first hot water 
treatment plant was installed. 
However, the end of the 1990s also witnessed an important conflict between actors involved in 
agriculture and Canadian mining firms, such as Manhattan Minerals of Canada in the Tambogrande region 
of Piura. The mining project, as well as its requirement for significant human re-settlement posed large-
scale appropriation of agricultural land, potential to pollute adjoining areas and displacement of farmers. 
The project, eventually abandoned in 2003, prompted coordinated opposition from parts of civil society 
including urban residents, market-oriented modernizing farmers and a rural peasantry (Bebbington, 2012). 
The experience and in particular the social mobilization behind it, cemented a regional commitment to 
investment in agri-food as an activity that would be likely to have more positive effects for the local 
population. This experience showed the ability to establish temporary local alliances, although tensions 
between producers with access to export markets and those without access appear  again through the 
existence of the two producer associations in the region, APEM and PROMANGO. APEM represents 
organisations combining exporting and production whilst PROMANGO, formed after a collapse of prices 
in 2002, represents smaller-scale producers. Members of both associations make up around 30% of 
growers and 60% of production and form the centrepiece of the study. Other key organisations at local 
level include SENASA, the phytosanitary government body and other service organisations play important 
roles. A key competence is reaching certification standards necessary for exports, combating fruit plagues 
such as fruit fly, incorporating a greater control and improvement in the detail of production processes and 
technologies and establishing good networks with a range of buyers from different export markets. 
8 Analysis of network coherence 
We begin the empirical analysis of network coherence that provides information on the degree of 
connectedness of producers. Figs. 2 and 3 below provide an illustrative overview of the network of both 
clusters. Small-scale producers are denoted with the prefix “agro” and all actors are coloured differently 
according to the type of organisation and their function in the clusters. If we include the organisations 
mentioned by the interviewees as providers of knowledge (i.e. not all those interviewed), the total number 
of mango cluster and the palm oil organisations in each cluster number 75 and 37 respectively. 
 
Fig. 2 Social Network Analysis Map of the Mango Cluster. 
 
Fig. 3 Social Network Analysis map of the palm oil cluster. Source: Calculated from author survey of mango 
producers and author survey of palm oil producers. [Note: Isolated actors such as “Sociedad de Comercio 
exterior”, “Fresh Peru”, “comprairer”, “img” and “pricewatch” were mentioned as organisations which are part 
of the network but whose knowledge transfer was considered “unimportant” by the interviewees. 
•  
•  
Fig. 2 and Fig 3 shows the network maps of the mango and palm oil clusters. The mango cluster 
appears as a highly-connected group of producer firms at the core of which are a group of service 
providers. The palm oil cluster illustrates a simpler hub-and-spoke structure with small-scale producers 
clustered around E1, a large local producer and refinery firm that is supplied palm oil by the surrounding 
small-scale farmers and CENIPALMA, the technology research arm of FEDEPALMA, the national 
producer association. Although CENIPALMA formally represents national palm oil producers, it is mainly 
influenced by the larger organisations that provide most of its funding. Although both networks appear 
highly centralized with limited connections between organisations at the peripheries, the mango cluster has 
more producers and services at the centre of the network. 
Table 2 describes the organisations and actors in each cluster. It is notable that although there are 
no large organisations in the mango cluster, there is more heterogeneity of organisations reflected in higher 
numbers of intermediaries, government services and universities that provide knowledge to the cluster. 
Table 2 
Source: Based on authors survey of palm oil and mango clusters. 
Types of Organisation Palm oil Mango 
Number of actors by 
organisation 
Percentage Number of actors by 
organisation 
Percentage 
Large producers 3 8% 0 0 
Small-scale producers 15 41% 26 35% 
Industry intermediaries 3 8% 15 20% 
State services 3 8% 8 11% 
Overseas organisation 0 0% 9 12% 
Consultancy 3 8% 5 7% 
University 4 11% 7 9% 
Certification firm and other 
services 
4 11% 5 7% 
Social organisation 2 5% 0 0% 
 
Total 37  75  
We use K-core method that allows observation of the number of links of all the vertices within the 
cluster and if any dense sub-networks exist to analyse bonding. Table 3 below shows mean average k-core 
values of 3.35 and 2 for the mango and palm oil cluster respectively indicating significantly higher levels 
of bonding in the mango cluster. Moreover, the distribution in the mango cluster is skewed towards higher 
values (64% of palm oil firms have just two links, 50% of mango firms have four links) meaning that a 
significant majority of small-scale farmers in the palm oil are reliant on just one or two channels of 
information. K-core also allows detection of dense sub-groups by removing the lowest k-cores from the 
network until this breaks up into dense components (de Nooy, 2011). With values of one omitted (i.e. we 
just include values 2 to 5) Fig 4 shows the palm oil network becomes very sparse at K-core equal to five 
and is reduced to just two organisations at K-core equal to ten. In other words very few actors have many 
links. The mango network by contrast shows five organisations at K-core equal to ten and three 
organisations at twenty. Although the palm oil growers are therefore formally connected, the number of 
connections is very sparse and dependent on just two organisations with a high number of links. By 
contrast within the mango clusters a number of organisations have up to ten or higher links. We can 
conclude that average bonding is significantly higher in the mango cluster but also that there are different 






Table 3 Summary results of social network analysis. 
Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil and mango producers. 
  Palm Oil Mango  





test (Sig. 2-tailed) 
Cohesion Indegree from within 
cluster 
2.06 0.827 3.85 2.073 0.000 
 K-Core 2 0.612 3.35 0.745 0.000 
Brokering Structural holes 
(betweeness centrality) 
0.39 0.21 0.66 0.12 0.000 
Openness Indegree from outside 
cluster 
0.88 1.9 2.85 2.014 0.025 
Degree of 
sharing 
Outdegree centrality 1.86 5.81 2.94 4.46  
Note: Mean values have been normalised to achieve normal distribution for t-test of significant difference. It was not 
possible to calculate significant difference for “outdegree centrality” because too few organisations in the survey share 
knowledge. 
And yet, a more detailed analysis of bonding in the mango cluster also reveals patterns of 
structural fragmentation hidden by average values of connectedness. K-core analysis reveals that there is 
no direct line of communication between APEM and PROMANGO the two most prominent organisations. 
Moreover, very few small-scale producers receive information from APEM and exporters from 
PROMANGO. Given their central positions as representative associations this  suggests asymmetric 
information between the exporters association (APEM) and small-scale producers (PROMANGO). 
In terms of bridging, we can refer to structural holes values that measure non-redundant 
information flows. Table 3 indicates high reliance in both clusters on a small number of organisations as 
conduits of knowledge. However this measure doesn’t distinguish bridging from inside and outside the 
cluster, knowledge from outside is likely to open the cluster to new ideas. To do this we look at averages 
of indegree centrality from outside the cluster. In Table 3 we can see that this differs significantly between 
the clusters, confirming that in the palm oil there is just one organisation that maintains significant links 
outside the cluster. The mango cluster by contrast shows more complexity in its structure with a greater 
variety of organisations acting as bridgers that include private producers and service providers. The data 
indicates that the mango cluster is more open to diverse knowledge. 
A revealing phenomenon appears if we compare indegree centrality from outside the cluster with 
outdegree centrality, i.e. organisations involved in bridging and bonding. Although we saw in the mango 
cluster that a number of organisations are active in gaining knowledge from outside the cluster, Figure 5 
shows that the privately owned organisations do not appear to be sharing this sharing knowledge, even 
with their associations (for example agro 21). Only the state-run phytiosanitary body, and the producer 
associations are involved in collective dissemination. Private firms in the mango cluster are more likely to 
maintain knowledge in the private sphere. This contrasts with the palm oil, where a single privately owned 
organisation refinery E1, acts as bridger and bonder, articulating the network of small-scale producers 
(see Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 4 K-core value. 




Fig. 5 Outdegree centrality. 
Source: Calculated from author survey of palm oil producers. 
 
Summarising the results of network structure we find that the in the palm oil cluster there are few 
lead organisations and therefore bridging values are lower. Low bonding reflects high reliance on a lead 
organisation through a simple hub-and-spoke type network structure. The mango cluster shows higher 
levels of bridging and bonding. The higher numbers of intermediary organisations help increase bridging 
values whilst some producers have broader links within the cluster. However there is also a more complex 
network structure with a sub groups represented by exporters and smaller producers. The establishment of 
separate networks may reflect homophily, a concept developed to explain why actors with similar 
characteristics (for example geographical, socio-economic, cultural) tend to stick together to form 
networks (McPherson et al., 2001). 
9 Case study interviews: bridging, bonding and 
governance 
As expected, the analysis of network structure within our two case studies established contrasting 
scenarios although governance in both clusters is characterised by top-down centralisation of practices. As 
discussed, the dominant narrative in the palm oil centres on containing the devastation caused by the 
spread of the pudricion de cogollo (PC) disease. Technicians based in the palm oil refinery firms at the 
centre of each cluster are responsible for diffusing know-how to surrounding small-scale producers. 
Therefore practices emanate in a hierarchical top-down fashion from established firms and attempts to 
reinterpret the design of the scheme are not encouraged. Officials of CENIPALMA further commented that 
convincing small-scale farmers to undertake training in recognising PC and to keep detailed records and 
take appropriate measures is critical. Opportunities to access knowledge also depend on the nature of the 
engagement and leadership provided by the organisation at the centre of each cluster. 
The interviews allowed us to differentiate two modes engagement that could be 
described as paternal and reluctant modes of engagement. Paternal engagement is represented by a 
dominant central organisation – in this case a large refinery firm – that steps in to assist small-scale 
farmers in the adoption of new techniques. However, in a neighbouring cluster with very similar 
characteristics, the interviews suggested that the large producer expends few efforts to establish effective 
channels of diffusion and refinery firms haven’t got the authority over small-scale producers to make them 
follow certain practices. 
A CENIPALMA official comments: 
“There are some nucleos where the leading company is only really interested in buying the fruit, it is not 
interested under which conditions this is produced, but there are cases … where the whole sanitary scheme 
is run by the anchor firm. So in some places it is working in others it hardly exists”. 
Relations between large and small-scale producers appear to reflect the ongoing pragmatism of 
small-scale farmers in Colombia towards both subsidies from the state and alliances with refinery firms, 
particularly given the limited ability of small-scale farmers to influence practices. 
Rather than dependence on one private producer, the mango cluster’s network identified a number 
of organisations with different governance structures at the centre of the cluster, although two producer 
associations wield significant agency power on behalf of their members. Network analysis also identified 
two sub-structures represented by small-sized producers, with their representative association 
PROMANGO at the centre and larger exporters with APEM at the centre. 
Our interviews suggested that these sub-structures are underpinned by fundamentally different 
approaches to the adoption of technology. The community of exporters around their association APEM is 
brought together to maximize exports and insertion in markets. APEM plays a strong brokering role by 
providing its members intelligence on prices in international markets, bringing in external experts for 
export certifications, opening up new export markets (currently in Asia) and establishing research 
partnerships with local universities. Implementation of day-to-day practices is largely the responsibility of 
individual firms that can hire agronomers to manage production. 
The PROMANGO association by contrast is overwhelmingly focused on the day-to-day practices 
of its members such has improving yields, encouraging best practice in the use of fertilizer, treatment of 
trees, storage and transporting. Its annual congresses resemble a community of practice as producers gather 
to share experiences. Choices regarding new technologies, such as the purchase of a hot-water treatment 
plant (required for exports) and diversification into grape and cacao production are discussed thoroughly at 
the congresses and the technology is shared by all members. The funds to buy capital and training are 
raised jointly. Smaller-scale producers therefore can influence practices and technology through their 
independent representations. 
PROMANGO officials recognized the need to transfer technologies and other competences with 
APEM and exporter firms for certification and to agree prices and acknowledged the need to strengthen the 
value chain. Nevertheless, as Figs. 3 and 4 showed, although some important firm-to-firm collaborations 
exist, there are few direct lines of communication between the two associations. As a PROMANGO 
official stated: 
“From APEM we receive nothing in terms of technological knowledge, a little bit of commercial 
information sometimes, such as databases of exporters, I’d give then one on a scale of one to five”. 
The sub-networks therefore reflect the direct access to export markets that members of APEM 
enjoy and PROMANGO don’t. This creates asymmetry of power between small-scale-scale producers and 
exporters in the value-chain. Larger exporters are also often accused of delaying payment to small-scale 
producers and can charge high packing prices. However, as indicated, there are also fundamentally 
different normative values between these sub-networks groups which feeds into different ways of using 
technology. APEM emphasizes individual entrepreneurship and developing the Piura region as a marketing 
brand. These are critical in determining the costs required to gain entry into export markets. As the APEM 
president noted: 
"APEM is defined by entrepreneurship, there are other institutions that play a more social role, and can help 
the smallest producers, but our members hardly intervene in this”. 
PROMANGO by contrast prioritizes solidarity and collective actions, where the needs of farmers 
and their families and communities guide strategies and choices of technologies. 
In summary, the mango cluster reflects important features of an open and inclusive cluster. There 
are significant relationships between structure and governance. High levels of bridging are encouraged by 
small-scale producer collective action which creates a demand for services that are different to those of the 
large producers (for example technologies that can be used collectively). Despite few bilateral peer-to-peer 
links between producers, higher levels of bonding is also explained because of the different intermediaries. 
Producers have access to more service organisations and groups of producers have their own representative 
organisations. 
Summarising, our two case studies appear in different parts of our typology. The palm oil cluster 
shows features of a fragmented cluster with one or two organisations at centre with external links. Low 
levels of bonding reflect absence of collective action and bilateral links by small-scale producers. Different 
factors may explain this including geographical dispersion of producers and the absence of coordinating 
organisations such as producer association or NGOs. Collective action may also be discouraged by closing 
down opportunities for alternative practices. 
10 Discussion and conclusions 
Despite both clusters being dominated by highly centralized protocols for production, our 
approach allowed us to detect different narratives and practices of inclusion resulting from differences in 
networks and governance relationships. Two dominant patterns of inclusion were initially identified with 
the help of our typology and case studies. In the palm oil cluster a relatively fragmented cluster appears 
with few bilateral links between small-scale producers and high reliance on a central actor, without whom 
the entire network would collapse. The impact of such dominant organisations is uncertain. Large local 
organisations can shepherd a community towards positive collective outcomes, for example by setting up 
experimental sites that can facilitate a process of learning-by-watching (Rao and Ibáñez, 2005). These can 
lead to highly rapid and efficient diffusion of information. Nevertheless, in highly dependent 
environments, dominant organisations may also coerce small-scale producers into outcomes that are less 
favourable for them. We also describe the mango cluster in Peru as “open and inclusive”, where top-down 
protocols for certifications and quality requirements combine with a search for new knowledge based on 
norms of participation that more closely respond to small-scale producer needs such as sharing technology. 
However knowledge asymmetries are evident between larger and smaller-scale producers. 
We conclude with two linked points. We firstly revisit the point made at the beginning of the 
paper concerning local (cluster) dynamics. It is clear that social capital dynamics can strongly influence 
types and forms of inclusion of small-scale producers in agri-food clusters. Therefore, whilst the 
introduction of agri-food value chains has detonated possibilities (including local alliances) for the 
establishment of new networks to penetrate markets, these are layered on to highly localised historical and 
contextual factors that build in structural tensions and exclusion. The paper therefore challenges some 
conceptions of technology diffusion where formal adoption of agricultural technologies or crop 
management practices is synonymous with innovation opportunities and benefits for all actors (Roeling, 
2007; Rogers, 2010). 
Secondly, we address a perceived gap in work on spatial analysis of inclusive innovation in 
agribusiness clusters identified by for example Fafchamps (2006) and Bebbington et al. (2004) through the 
use of a diagnostic of network structure. Network analysis can provide exact measurable qualities that 
underlie the dynamic social processes of interest to social capital as well as facilitating specification and 
testing. However, social networks does not always overlap with social capital (Moody and Paxton, 2009). 
Thus the structural cleavage of the mango network was a critical point, but could not be understood 
through small world’s type approaches of Barabási (2003). Qualitative social capital analysis was required 
to clearly express the close relation between social capital and social embeddedness i.e positive feeling 
about associationalism or shared values (Moody and Paxton, 2009). By contrast, in the palm oil cluster it 
was the hierarchical nature of the network and how the agency of the refinery firm was expressed that 
appeared critical to technology diffusion for small-scale producers. The implications of our approach are 
double, information on structure provides important insights into the properties of relations but ignoring 
the context of networks will provide only a partial picture. Therefore, as Moody and Paxton (2009) point 
out, it is difficult to divorce the structure of social networks from social capital and we are better served by 
carefully predicting the outcomes of each. 
11 Policy implications 
The analysis revealed that the dynamics of production and inclusion differed quite substantially 
and therefore require different policy approaches. The mango case suggested a combined policy approach 
that bridges the divide between exporters and non-exporters that will reduce exclusions created by 
exclusive access to exporters. However, policy measures that support different export models (large-scale 
commodity production by APEM and smaller scale production based on organic and fair trade) can 
increase cluster diversity and strengthen options for inclusion. For the palm oil cluster the discussion of 
inclusion will be influenced by the dominant role of the large refinery organisations that also acts as buyer 
of the produce of small-scale farmers. Increasing the diversity of the cluster by broadening the provision of 
services to small-scale producers and lessening the dependence on one central anchor organisation will 
reduce small-scale producer vulnerability and is likely to enrich provision of knowledge. 
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Footnotes 
1This includes the United Nations Development Programme “Growing inclusive 
Markets”: see http://www.growinginclusivemarkets.org/1. 
2Although not central to this paper, one of the main criticisms Cáceres (2015) makes regarding the 
expansion of agribusiness is land grab and displacement of lands held by small producers. 
3We specifically refer to a typology rather taxonomy because the objective is to put forward ideal scenarios 
that help develop new approaches to the study of inclusion in agricultural clusters. 
4This wording is similar to that used by Giuliani (2007) in her study of knowledge networks in the wine 
industry. 
5There are three classifications of farm size in the pal oil sector: large growers (more than 500 ha), 
medium-sized grower (between 50 and 500 ha) and small sized growers (less than 50 ha) (Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013). 
 
 
